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Abstract
This paper introduces xed tree games with repeated players (FRP
games) which are a generalization of standard xed tree games. This
generalization consists in allowing players to be located in more than
one vertex. As a consequence, these players can choose among several
ways of connection with the root.
In this paper we show that FRP games are balanced. Moreover, we
prove that the core of an FRP game coincides with the core of a related
concave xed tree game. We show how to nd the nucleolus and we
characterize the orders which provide marginal vectors in the core of
an FRP game.
Classication: C71
Keywords: Cooperative game, xed tree game, core.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider a generalization of the xed tree problem, introduced
by Megiddo (1978). In a xed tree problem a rooted tree   and a set of agents
N is given, each agent being located at precisely one vertex of   and each
vertex containing precisely one agent. Megiddo (1978) associates with such a
problem a cooperative cost game (N;c), a xed tree game, where, for every
coalition S  N, c(S) denotes the minimal cost needed to connect all members
of S to the root via a subtree of  .
Fixed tree games and variants of xed tree games have also been studied
in Galil (1980), Maschler et al. (1995), Granot et al. (1996), Koster (1999),
Van Gellekom (2000) and Koster et al. (2001). The special case where the
tree is a chain corresponds to airport games, which have been considered in
Littlechild (1974), Littlechild and Owen (1977) and Littlechild and Thompson
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1(1977). Variants of xed tree games, where it is allowed that one vertex is
occupied by more players or by no player, are considered in e.g. Koster (1999)
and Van Gellekom (2000). However, in these variants it is still required that
every player occurs in precisely one vertex.
In this paper we generalize the model of Megiddo (1978) in the sense that
players may occur repeatedly, i.e. in more than one vertex of the given tree.
As a motivation for this generalized model one can consider for example the
following irrigation problem. Consider a set of parcels in a desert environment
which need to be irrigated from a well. For that reason, a network has been
designed which allows the transportation of water from the well to at least
one of the corners of each parcel. Consider, for example, the situation with

















Figure 1: An irrigation problem with eight parcels.
Bold lines indicate the network that has already been constructed. The
players are facing the problem of dividing the maintenance costs of this net-
work, so they are facing a xed tree problem where the tree is as depicted in
Figure 2.
With this xed tree we can associate in a natural way a cooperative cost
game (N;c). For every coalition S  N the number c(S) denotes the minimal
cost needed to connect all members of S at least once to the root via a subtree.
This leads to the class of xed tree games with repeated players.
Standard xed tree games and the variants of these games are known to
be concave. We will show that this needs not be true for xed tree games
with repeated players. However, we will show that these games are balanced,
by showing that the core of a xed tree game with repeated players coincides
with the core of some related standard xed tree game. Moreover, we analyze
which marginal vectors provide core elements.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall some notions
from graph theory and cooperative game theory. In Section 3 we formally
introduce xed tree games with repeated players and in Section 4 we focus on










Figure 2: Fixed tree of the problem in Figure 1.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall some notions of graph theory and cooperative game
theory.
A tree   = (V;E) is an undirected connected graph without cycles, with
set of vertices V and set of edges E. The set V contains a vertex which has a
special meaning. We denote this vertex by 0 and refer to it as the root. For
each vertex v 2 V there is a unique path from the root to vertex v, which we
denote by P(v).
The precedence relation (V;) on V is dened by v  v0 if and only if
v 2 P(v0). Analogously we dene the precedence relation (E;) on the set of
edges. A trunk of (V;E) is a set of vertices T  V containing the root which
is closed under the precedence relation (V;), i.e. if v 2 T and v0  v, then
v0 2 T. Hence, the subtree corresponding to this set of vertices T is connected.
The set of followers of a vertex v is the set F(v) = fv0 2 V jv  v0g. A vertex
v is called a leaf if F(v) = fvg. Analogously we dene the set of edges F(e)
following an edge e. Note that it holds that e 2 F(e).
A cooperative (cost) game is a tuple (N;c) where N = f1;2;:::;ng is the
3set of players, and c : 2N ! R is its characteristic (cost) function, in which,
c(S) is interpreted as the total cost of coalition S. By convention, c(;) = 0.
The core of a cost game (N;c) is the set




xi = c(N) and
X
i2S
xi  c(S) for all S  Ng:
If x 2 C(c), then no coalition S  N has an incentive to split o from the
grand coalition N if x is the proposed vector of cost shares. A game (N;c)
is called balanced if it has a nonempty core and totally balanced if the core
of every subgame is nonempty, where the subgame corresponding to some
coalition T  N, T 6= ;, is the game (T;cT) with cT(S) = c(S) for all S  T.
An order on the players is a bijection  : N ! f1;:::;ng, where (i) = j
means that player i is at position j. For every order  : N ! f1;:::;ng we
dene the marginal vector m(c) by
m

k(c) = c(fl 2 Nj(l)  (k)g)   c(fl 2 Nj(l) < (k)g)
for every k 2 N.
A game (N;c) is called monotone if for every S;T 2 2N with S  T, we
have c(S)  c(T). Moreover, for a balanced monotonic game (N;c) it holds
that xi  0 for every x 2 C(c).
A game (N;c) is concave if for every i 2 N and every S  T  Nnfig,
we have c(S [ fig)   c(S)  c(T [ fig)   c(T). Hence, for concave games the
marginal contribution of a player to any coalition is larger than his marginal
contribution to a larger coalition. It is a well known result that a cost game
is concave if and only if all marginal vectors are core elements (cf. Shapley
(1971) and Ichiishi (1981)). Hence, concave cost games are balanced.
3 Model and game
In this section we introduce xed tree problems with repeated players and its
associated cooperative games.
Denition 1. A xed tree problem with repeated players, FRP problem for
short, is a 5-tuple
  = (N;(V;E);0;(S(v))v2V ;(a(e))e2E)
where
1. N = f1;2;:::;ng is a nite set of players;
2. (V;E) is a tree with vertex set V and edge set E;
3. 0 is a special element of V , called the root of the tree;
44. S(v)  N is, for every v 2 V , a (possibly empty) subset of players
occupying vertex v;
5. a(e) > 0 is, for every edge e 2 E, the cost associated with edge e;
which satises the following assumptions
(A1) for every i 2 N there is a v 2 V with i 2 S(v);
(A2) for each leaf t 2 V , there is an i 2 N such that i 2 S(t) and
i = 2 S(v) for every v 2 V nftg.
Assumption (A1) states that every player should occupy at least one vertex
in the tree. Assumption (A2) states that the tree (V;E) is \optimal" for the
grand coalition N, in the sense that no proper subtree of (V;E) provides at
least one connection with the root for every i 2 N.
Players who occupy at least two vertices are called repeated players. Play-
ers who occupy precisely one vertex are called essential players. If an FRP







Figure 3: Two trees which depict cost sharing problems.
Example 1. In Figure 3 two cost sharing problems are depicted.
We can easily see that the tree on the left does not correspond to an FRP
problem because after removing one of the edges, all three players remain
connected to the root. Hence, Assumption (A2) is violated.
The tree on the right, on the contrary, corresponds to an FRP problem. It
has three leaves and each of them is occupied by one essential player. Never-
theless, this is not a standard tree problem as dened in Megiddo (1978) since
each of the players 1, 2 and 3 is located in more than one vertex.
For an FRP problem we can dene a corresponding cost game.
Denition 2. Let   = (N;(V;E);0;(S(v))v2V ;(a(e))e2E) be an FRP prob-
lem. The corresponding xed tree game with repeated players, FRP game for








for every S  N; S 6= ;
c(;) = 0
where AS is the collection of admissible subtrees for coalition S. A subtree is
admissible for coalition S  N if it provides at least one connection with the
root for every i 2 S.






Figure 4: An FRP problem.
Example 2. In Figure 4 an FRP problem is depicted. The set of admissible
trees for player 1 is Af1g = ff(A;B)g;f(A;C)g;f(A;B);(A;C)gg. It now
holds that c(f1g) = minf3;5;3 + 5g = 3.
From the denition of FRP games it easily follows that FRP games are
monotonic games since for every S  T  N, we have AS  AT.
Note that in the tree on the right depicted in Figure 3, the position of
player 1 in the vertex with player 5 seems irrelevant since the path from the
root to this vertex contains another vertex occupied by player 1. We formalize
this idea below.
Given an FRP problem
  = (N;(V;E);0;(S(v))v2V ;(a(e))e2E)




where for every v 2 V
S
red(v) = fi 2 S(v) : there is no v
0 2 P(v);v
0 6= v with i 2 S(v
0)g:
That is, from the set of players occupying vertex v, those which also occupy
a preceding vertex are dropped. Observe that the essential players remain in
their initial vertex. The cost game associated with the reduced problem will













Figure 5: An FRP problem   and the corresponding reduced problem  red.
Example 3. In Figure 5 an FRP problem   is depicted and its corresponding
reduced problem  red. In the rst tree, player 7 is located in four dierent
vertices. So player 7 can choose among four dierent paths to be connected
to the root. However, the path that ends in the vertex occupied by players 6
and 7 is part of the path that ends in the vertex occupied by players 2, 6 and
7. Therefore player 7 will never choose this second path to connect himself to
the root, since this path yields a higher cost. Therefore we can delete player
7 from the vertex occupied by players 2, 6 and 7 without changing the game.
Proceeding in this way we obtain the reduced problem  red which is de-
picted in the second tree of Figure 5.
The proof of the following proposition is straightforward and therefore
omitted.
Proposition 1. Let (N;c) be an FRP game corresponding to an FRP problem
and let (N;cred) be the game corresponding to its associated reduced FRP
problem. Then (N;c) and (N;cred) coincide.
Henceforth we assume in the sequel of this paper, without loss of generality,
that an FRP problem is reduced.
4 The core
In this section we show that FRP games are balanced and we focus on the
structure of the core.
Standard xed tree games are known to be concave. Hence, it follows
that these games are balanced. The following example illustrates that this
7argument can not be used for FRP games, since these games need not be
totally balanced, and therefore not concave.
Example 4. Let (N;c) be the FRP game obtained from the second FRP
problem depicted in Figure 3. The characteristic function of the subgame
restricted to coalition f1;2;3g is the following
S f1g f2g f3g f1;2g f1;3g f2;3g f1;2;3g
cf1;2;3g(S) 3 3 5 3 5 6 8
Now suppose that C(cf1;2;3g) 6= ;. Then there is an x 2 C(cf1;2;3g). It
follows that x1 + x2  cf1;2;3g(f1;2g) = 3. Similarly we have that x1 + x3 
cf1;2;3g(f1;3g) = 5 and x2 + x3  cf1;2;3g(f2;3g) = 6. Adding these three
expressions yields 2(x1 + x2 + x3)  14, or equivalently x1 + x2 + x3  7.
However, since x 2 C(cf1;2;3g) it holds that x1 + x2 + x3 = 8. Because of this
contradiction we conclude that C(cf1;2;3g) = ;, and therefore that (N;c) is not
totally balanced.
Next we will show that FRP games have a nonempty core. In order to do
so we will show that the core of an FRP game coincides with the core of a
related standard FRP game. Since this standard FRP game is concave and
thus balanced, we then conclude that FRP games are balanced as well.
Consider the FRP problem   = (N;(V;E);0;(S(v))v2V ;(a(e))e2E). We
obtain the related standard FRP problem  st by relocating the repeated play-
ers. In particular, each repeated player gets relocated to precisely one vertex.
This new situation is dened by the 5-tuple
 
st = (N;(V;E);0;( S(v))v2V;(a(e))e2E);
where  S(v) is obtained from S(v) as follows.
If player i 2 N is a repeated player in  , then there is more than one path
connecting him with the root. Since (V;E) is a tree, the common part of all
these paths is again a path. Let v 2 V be the furthest vertex from the root
on this common path, then in the new problem, player i is located only in
vertex v.
If player i 2 N is essential in   then in  st this player remains in the same
vertex. That is, if i is an essential player in   and i 2 S(v), then i 2  S(v).
In the following example the construction of  st is illustrated.
Example 5. Consider the FRP problem   corresponding to the tree depicted
in Figure 6.
From   we obtain  st by changing only the position of the repeated players.
For example player 4 can choose between two paths in order to be connected
to the root. The intersection of these two paths is the path which contains
the root and the vertex occupied by player 6. In  st, player 4 occupies the
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Figure 6: An FRP problem and the corresponding standard xed tree problem.
players 4, 7 and 9, also move to vertices which are closer to the root. Observe
that player 7 is reallocated to the root. Meanwhile all essential players remain
in the same vertex.
Granot et al. (1996) show that standard xed tree games are concave.
The following proposition weakly generalizes this result and can be proved in
a similar way. Therefore the proof is omitted.
Proposition 2. Cost games corresponding to standard FRP's are concave.
In the following theorem we show that the cores of the cost games cor-
responding to an FRP problem and its associated standard FRP problem
coincide.
Theorem 1. Let   = (N;(V;E);0;(S(v))v2V ;(a(e))e2E) be an FRP problem
and let  st = (N;(V;E);0;( S(v))v2V;(a(e))e2E) be the corresponding stan-
dard FRP problem. Let (N;c) and (N;cst) be the corresponding cost games.
Then it holds that C(c) = C(cst).
Proof. First note that cst(S)  c(S) for every S  N and cst(N) = c(N). As
a consequence we get C(cst)  C(c).
Now we show that C(c)  C(cst). Let x 2 C(c). From the monotonicity
of (N;c) it follows that x  0. We need to show that for every S  N it holds
that x(S)  cst(S), or equivalently that x(NnS)  c(N)   cst(S).
Let S  N, and let VS be the set of vertices in which the members of S
are located in the standard FRP problem, i.e. VS = fv 2 V j S(v) \ S 6= ;g.
Let TS be the smallest trunk containing VS, and let ES be the subset of
9edges corresponding to this trunk. By denition of TS it holds that cst(S) = P
e2ES
a(e).
Now let OS denote the set of outgoing edges of TS, i.e. OS =
f(i;j) 2 Eji 2 TS and j = 2 TSg. Furthermore let, for all e 2 OS, Ve be the





and let Ie = NnIc
e. In other words, Ie are those players which appear only in
vertices of Ve, and Ic
e is its complement. Because of assumption (A2) it follows
that Ie 6= ; for each e 2 OS.
Let e 2 OS. Since each member of Ic
e appears at least once in a vertex of














eciency of x we deduce that








Hence, the players which appear only in one branch of the tree pay the
entire cost of that branch.
If j 2 S, then it follows that j 62 Ie for every e 2 OS. Therefore,[e2OSIe 
NnS. By denition of Ie it follows that Ie \ I e = ; for all e;  e 2 OS, e 6=  e.








x(Ie) = x([e2OSIe)  x(NnS);












a(f) = c(N)   cst(S).
We conclude that x(NnS)  c(N)   cst(S).
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and the
fact that concave games have a nonempty core.
Corollary 1. The core of an FRP game is nonempty.
Theorem 1 also enables us to obtain the nucleolus of an FRP game. The
nucleolus is a well known one-point solution concept introduced by Schmeidler
(1969). The nucleolus has the property that it is a core element whenever the
core is nonempty. Potters and Tijs (1994) showed that if two games have
the same core, with one of the games being concave, then both games have
the same nucleolus as well. Hence, we conclude using Theorem 1 that the
nucleolus of an FRP game coincides with the nucleolus of its associated stan-
dard FRP game. In Megiddo (1978) it is proved that the nucleolus of a xed
10tree game can be computed within O(n3) operations. Later on, Galil (1980)
reduced the complexity of determining the nucleolus to O(nlogn). Another
algorithm, presented by Granot et al. (1996), has a complexity of O(n2), and
in some trees only O(n). In Maschler et al. (1995) other algorithms are given,
and also a painting story that shows monotonicity properties of the nucleolus
in a xed tree game.
The last part of this section is dedicated to marginal vectors. We will char-
acterize the marginal vectors that are core elements. First we need some
denitions.
Let   = (N;(V;E);0;(S(v))v2V ;(a(e))e2E) be an FRP problem and  st =
(N;(V;E);0;( S(v))v2V;(a(e))e2E) be the corresponding standard FRP prob-
lem. For every i 2 N we dene
Ni = fj 2 Nj there exists v;v
0 2 V with v
0 2 F(v); i 2 S(v); j 2  S(v
0)g:
Note that for every essential player we have i 2 Ni. A coalition S  N
is called proper if for every i 2 S there exists a player j 2 S \ Ni. These
denitions are illustrated in Example 6.
Example 6. Consider the FRP problem   depicted in Figure 6. Player 4 is a
repeated player who appears in two dierent vertices, say v1 and v2. Consider
now these two vertices v1 and v2 in  st and the corresponding sets of vertices
F(v1) and F(v2). The set of players located in these sets of vertices in  st is
N4. More precisely, N4 = f1;8g [ f3;9;10;5g = f1;3;5;8;9;10g.
Consider now coalition S = f4;6g. We can easily see that N4 \ S = ;.
Therefore coalition S is not proper. On the contrary, coalition T = f1;4;6g
is proper. Since, 1 and 6 are both essential it holds that 1 2 N1 \ T and
6 2 N6 \ T. It is also obvious that 1 2 N4 \ T.
The following lemma states that proper coalitions have the same cost in
the FRP game and in its associated standard FRP game, while non proper
coalitions have a strictly larger cost in the FRP game than in its associated
standard FRP game.
Lemma 1. Let   = (N;(V;E);0;(S(v))v2V ;(a(e))e2E) be an FRP problem
and let  st = (N;(V;E);0;( S(v))v2V;(a(e))e2E) be the corresponding stan-
dard FRP problem. Let (N;c) and (N;cst) be the corresponding cost games.
Then the following holds:
(i) c(S) = cst(S) for all proper S  N,
(ii) c(S) > cst(S) for all non proper S  N.
Proof. Let S  N. Let T  be the optimal tree for S in  st and let V (T )
be the vertex set corresponding to this tree. Since for every T 2 AS( ) we
have T   T, it holds that c(S)  cst(S). Moreover, c(S) = cst(S) if and only
11if T  2 AS( ). Hence we only need to prove that S is proper if and only if
T  2 AS( ).
First assume that S is proper. Let i 2 S and let j 2 Ni \ S. There are
v;v0 2 V with v0 2 F(v), i 2 S(v) and j 2  S(v0). Since T  is optimal for S in
 st and j 2  S(v0), it must hold that v0 2 V (T ). Since v0 2 F(v) this implies
that v 2 V (T ). We conclude that T  connects all i 2 S to the root in  .
Therefore we have that T  2 AS( ).
To show the reverse, assume that T  2 AS( ). We want to show that S is
proper. Let i 2 S. Since T  is admissible for S in   there is a v 2 V (T ) with
i 2 S(v). Because T  is optimal for S in  st, there is a j 2 S and a v0 2 V (T )
with v0 2 F(v) and j 2  S(v0). Thus j 2 S \ Ni. Hence S is proper.
The next theorem characterizes those orders that provide marginal vectors
that are core elements.
Theorem 2. Let (N;(V;E);0;(S(v))v2V ;(a(e))e2E) be an FRP problem, (N;c)
the corresponding FRP game and  : N ! f1;:::;ng an ordering of the set
of players. Then m(c) 2 C(c) if and only if for every i 2 N there exists a
j 2 Ni such that (j)  (i).
Proof. Let (N;(V;E);0;( S(v))v2V;(a(e))e2E) be the associated standard FRP
problem, and (N;cst) its corresponding game. First we show the \if" part.
Assume that  : N ! f1;:::;ng is such that for every player i 2 N there
exists a player j 2 Ni such that (j)  (i). Now let k 2 N. By assumption
it holds that for all i 2 fl 2 Nj(l)  (k)g there is a j 2 Ni with (j)  (i).
Hence, j 2 fl 2 Nj(l)  (k)g and we conclude that fl 2 Nj(l)  (k)g is













st(fl 2 Nj(l)  (k)g)   c










where the second equality follows by Lemma 1 and the fact that fl 2
Nj(l)  (k)g and fl 2 Nj(l) < (k)g are proper, the rst inequality by the
concavity of (N;cst) and the last inequality again by Lemma 1. As a result
we have that m(c) 2 C(c).
Second we show the \only if" part. Assume  : N ! f1;:::;ng is such that
there exists a player i 2 N such that for any j 2 Ni it holds that (j) > (i).
Let i be the rst player in the order  with this property. Consider now









i(c) = c(S), it follows that
P
i2S m
i(c) > cst(S), and therefore
m(c) = 2 C(cst). Hence, by Theorem 1 we have m(c) = 2 C(c).
Every extreme point of C(cst) coincides with a marginal vector of (N;cst).
The following example shows that this need not hold for C(c), i.e. there are
extreme points in C(c) that do not coincide with marginal vectors of (N;c).
Example 7. Consider the FRP problem depicted in Figure 7.
Then C(c) = C(cst) = Cof(3;0;5;6);(0;0;8;6);(0;0;5;9);(0;3;5;6)g. It
is straightforward that there is no  : N ! f1;:::;ng such that m(c) =
(0;3;5;6). Moreover, not all marginal vectors of (N;c) are core elements. For
instance, m(c) = (0;8;0;6) = 2 C(c) where  = (3;4;1;2).
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